September 12, 2026: Ukraine currently has 335 aircraft. A third are jet fighters, including 38 F-16s. Eventually, they will have more than sixty F-16s, but it takes time to train pilots and maintainers and prepare airbases to operate them. French Mirage 2000 fighters are equipped with modern radars and electronic warfare systems and have proved very effective at detecting and destroying incoming Russian missiles and large attack drones. France has ordered 16 Rafale fighter-bombers, and Sweden has ordered over a hundred Gripen E, with 16 to arrive this year. Ukraine still operates Russian-made aircraft that Ukraine obtained before hostilities with Russia began in 2014. These aircraft include 42 MiG-29s and 22 Su-27 fighter-bombers.

The F-16s have some unique assignments in Ukraine. Because air defenses on both sides are so robust, neither side has air superiority and must keep its aircraft out of range of enemy air defense systems. The F-16s are most useful as another air-defense weapon to destroy Russian cruise-missile attacks. One F-16 destroyed six of these missiles in one sortie during December 2024, which might make its pilot an ace, depending on the definition of ace, which historically meant downing five fighter aircraft.

The F-16s have proved invaluable as a last line of defense against cruise missiles that got past the air defenses. The Russian style of air control has jet fighters operating under ground controllers' orders. Ukraine uses the more flexible Western method, where pilots are briefed before takeoff on where to go and what to attack. After that, it’s the pilot’s choice when and how he carries out these attacks.

Ukrainian pilots found the F-16s easier to operate than the Russian-designed aircraft they previously used. The F-16s are more reliable and, with more NATO-standard aircraft electronics, pilots can detect and destroy targets much faster. This autonomy means Russian jamming has little impact. F-16s used American AGM-88 HARM missiles that detected Russian radars and destroyed them, even if the radar operators shut down the radars in an effort to save them. This suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) operations greatly reduced the number of operational Russian air defense radars.

F-16s and other Western fighters are used to intercept Russian guided glide bomb and drone attacks. The F-16s often employ inexpensive laser-guided APKWS II missiles to down Russian targets. Ukraine also has NATO-supplied anti-aircraft systems like the medium-range NASAMS and IRIS-T SLS/SLM, and longer-range interceptors like the SAMP/T and Patriot. Because of the war with Iran, they are out of Patriot interceptors and probably won’t receive more until next year. In general, Ukraine never has enough missiles for the NATO-supplied air defense systems. European nations have increased missile production and are flying them to Ukraine as soon as they come off the assembly line.

Against persistent Russian Saheed/Geran drone attacks, Ukraine uses a detection network based on ordinary Ukrainian cell phones, which transmit incoming attack locations and numbers and alert the nearest air defense systems to move to where the drones could be shot down. Truck-mounted heavy machine guns are used and proved remarkably effective. Russia is developing a jet-propelled Geran drone that will make interception more difficult. Current Gerans are known for being low, slow, and loud.

The Russian air force has suffered heavy losses that are not easily replaced. Russian aviation manufacturers face growing maintenance and production challenges. For example, recently, an air force Tu-22M3 heavy bomber crashed during a training flight. The preliminary cause was a technical malfunction. This was the third Tu-22M3 loss due to malfunctions in three years. Similarly, last month, a Russian Boeing 737 nearly crashed over the Black Sea due to engine failure while en route to Arkhangelsk. At the last moment, the plane returned to its departure airport.

These incidents highlight the growing problems with aircraft maintenance in Russia. NATO sanctions have restricted access to essential parts, reducing efforts to maintain aircraft properly. Desperate to keep its aircraft in the air, Russia has resorted to cannibalizing some aircraft and relying on expensive smuggled parts. With fewer aircraft flying more often, the risk of accidents increases.

Problems first appeared in 2023, after a year of heavy combat. Then Ukraine used missiles and drones to attack airfields close to the Ukrainian border. This forced Russia to move many of its heavy bombers to airbases up to 6,000 kilometers from Ukraine. This made it more expensive and time-consuming for these bombers to carry and launch cruise missiles at Ukrainian targets. The added wear and tear reduced their useful lives.

The NATO sanctions are also disrupting production of Russian fighters and fighter-bombers, such as the Su-30, Su-34, Su-35, and perhaps even the 10 new 6th-generation Su-57 aircraft. Production rates for these aircraft are only about 30 per year, which is not enough to replace losses from training, obsolescence, and combat. Russian plans for a new heavy bomber are on hold because of the sanctions and the cost of the war in Ukraine.

Obviously, Russian commercial aviation is suffering similar, and in many cases worse, problems. The development and production of Russian-designed and manufactured airliners were eventually halted. Russia can no longer obtain spare parts and maintenance support for its Airbus and Boeing airliners, which account for 70 percent of Russian commercial airliners, and over 90 percent of all commercial flights are operated by these foreign airliners. Boeing and Airbus had sold or leased these aircraft to Russia and demanded their return after Russia invaded Ukraine. Russia refused, but is now cut off from manufacturer support and must rely on smuggled parts and whatever help it can get from China. Currently, about twenty percent of these are grounded.